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LEONARD v. GEORGE
the Court has come a long way from its original position
that the selectee's only remedy available was by way of
habeas corpus to its acknowledgment that a selectee may,
under appropriate circumstances, assert as a positive de-
fense in a criminal prosecution for violation of the pro-
vision of the Selective Training and Service Act the in-
validity of an erroneous classification by the draft board.
This line of cases again demonstrates that whether a
statute explicitly provides that administrative action shall
be "final", or whether it is silent as to reviewability, the
controlling factor seems to be the views held by the in-
dividual judges as to the desirability of review of the facts
involved in the particular case under consideration.'
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AS A BAR TO SUIT
FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Leonard v. George'
Plaintiff, the manager of defendant's turkey farm, was
arrested on a warrant sworn out under the direction of
defendant, charging breach of trust with fraudulent intent,
a felony under the law of South Carolina. After being kept
in jail a few hours, he was released on bail; and, after he
had made payment to defendant's representative Boykin
to cover part of an alleged shortage in the number of tur-
keys entrusted to his keeping, the prosecution against him
was dismissed. There was evidence tending to show that
defendant told Boykin to get at least partial reparation
before dismissing the prosecution; that Boykin threatened
to keep plaintiff in jail for 72 hours or until he could count
all the turkeys and that Boykin told plaintiff that he knew
plaintiff was not guilty of the crime charged. Plaintiff
went through with the settlement but repeatedly protested
his innocence and claimed the payment was a "hold up"
which he had to submit to in order to get away to obtain
another position offered him.
In the District Court plaintiff brought actions for abuse
of criminal process and for malicious prosecution. The two
actions were consolidated and upon the completion of plain-
tiff's evidence, defendant's motion for dismissal was granted
on the ground that where the prosecution is terminated
aSee DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1951), Ch. 19, pp. 832-839, 865-867.
1178 F. 2d 312 (4th Cir., 1949).
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by agreement between the parties no action for malicious
prosecution will lie.
The plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted in
subsequent hearings.' The Court, recognized the general
rule as laid down by the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
which said: 3
".. . if a prosecution is terminated by agreement be-
tween the parties, or at any instance, or upon the con-
sent, of the accused, there is no such termination as will
support an action for malicious prosecution, . ..
However, the District Court also stated that an excep-
tion to the general rule recognized by the South Carolina
court was applicable; that the general rule is not applied
where the compromise is not voluntary, but the result of
coercion or duress. The trial was had before a jury which
found for plaintiff in both cases and the appeal was taken
in the malicious prosecution case.
On the appeal, the court reversed, holding that a com-
promise and settlement arrived at without duress negatives
the essential element of lack of probable cause, and an
action for malicious prosecution would not lie. Thus, the
compromise and settlement of the criminal action estopped
the plaintiff from contending it was instituted without
probable cause. The Court cited an Iowa case which held:
"... where the termination of the case is brought
about by a compromise or settlement ... understand-
ingly entered into, it is such an admission that there
was probable cause that the plaintiff cannot afterwards
retract it and try the question which by settlement he
waived."5
The Court recognized that where the settlement is made
through duress, coercion or without understanding of its
nature, it has no effect as an estoppel, but rejected plaintiff's
argument that the settlement here was made under duress,
citing a Mississippi case which held that where plaintiff was
out on bail under no sort of duress other than liability to
answer a criminal charge which had been made against
him, such duress is no basis for holding settlement was not
2 George v. Leonard, 71 F. Supp. 662 (E. D. S. C., 1947) ; George v.
Leonard, 71 F. Supp. 665 (E. D. S. C., 1947).
'Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S. C. 498, 172 S. E. 870 (1934).
Ibid, 873.




voluntary, since it is necessarily present in every settle-
ment or compromise of this character.6
A dissenting opinion, however, stated that the general
rule that an action for malicious prosecution is barred
if the dismissal of the criminal prosecution was brought
about by voluntary agreement of parties did not apply
here. The evidence showed that plaintiff had protested his
innocence of the crime charged and had stated he was pay-
ing under protest; it left the question of whether settlement
was voluntary to the jury, and it could not be held as a
matter of law that settlement constituted estoppel.
Subsequently, the plaintiff's petition for certiorari to
the Court of Appeals was denied by the United States
Supreme Court.7
The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are:
a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defen-
dant against the plaintiff; termination of the proceeding in
favor of the accused; absence of probable cause for the pro-
ceeding; malice, or a primary purpose in instituting the pro-
ceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice.'
Termination of the criminal action in favor of the ac-
cused is essential. In Hyde v. Greuch, the Court stated:
"In an ordinary action for malicious prosecution,
it is essential to aver in the declaration, and to prove
at the trial, that the prosecution has terminated in
favor of the party against whom it was instituted." 10
The great weight of American authority holds that
where a criminal proceeding is dismissed or abandoned by
procurement of the party prosecuted, by settlement or com-
promise with the prosecutor, it is not such a final determi-
nation of the matter in the accused's favor as will support
an action for malicious prosecution."
6 Jones v. Donald Co., 137 Miss. 602, 102 So. 540 (1925).
7 George v. Leonard, 339 U. S. 965 (1950).
SPRossERa, TORTS (1941), Sec. 96.
'62 Md. 577 (1884).
oIbid, 582.
"Morton v. Young, 55 Me. 24, 92 Am. Dec. 55 (1861) ; Lamprey v. H. P.
Hood & Sons, 73 N. H. 384, 62 A. 380 (1905) ; Smith v. M-arkensohn, 29
R. I. 55, 69 A. 311 (1908) ; Lowande v. Eisenberg Farms, 286 N. Y. 634,
36 N. E. 2d 684 (1941) ; Alexander v. Lindsay, 230 N. C. 663, 55 S. E. 2d
470 (1949) ; Smith v. Otwell, 51 Ga. App. 741, 181 S. E. 493 (1935) ; Davis
v. Brady, 218 Ky. 384, 291 S. W. 412 (1927) ; Lyons v. Davy-Pocahontas
Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 739, 84 S. E. 744 (1915) ; Nelson v. National Casualty
Co., 179 Minn. 53, 228 N. W. 437, 67 A. L. R. 509 (1929) ; Jones v. Donald
Co., 137 Miss. 602, 102 So. 540 (1925) ; Curls v. Lenox Garage Co., 68 Ohio
App. 285, 40 N. E. 2d 213 (1941) ; Ewe v. Angland, 325 Ill. App. 677, 60
N. E. 2d 774 (1945) ; Bristol v. Eckhardt, 254 Wisc. 297, 36 N. W. 2d 56
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This view is also uniformly followed by text writers."
In an annotation in the American Law Reports, it is stated
that:
"It has been almost, though not quite, universally
held that no such termination of a criminal proceeding
as may be availed of for the purpose of an action for
malicious prosecution can be predicated upon the dis-
missal of that proceeding, without regard to its merits,
as the result of a compromise or settlement of the par-
ties, particularly where such disposition of the matter
has been induced by, or effected at the instance of, the
person accused, or, as it has been frequently said, pro-
cured by him."','
Although American authorities are numerous, no Mary-
land Court of Appeals case on the point has been found.
There is also a dearth of English and Canadian authorities.
Such absence was noted in a Canadian case which followed
the American weight of authority in holding that a mere
release or discharge of one charged criminally as a result
of a compromise whereby a certain sum was paid, was not
such a favorable termination as to justify suit. 4 In an
English decision, it was held that an action for malicious
arrest could not be maintained where a cause had been
terminated by a Stet Processus with the consent of the
parties. 5
Cases contrary to the general rule are few and not quite
directly on point. In a California case, the evidence dis-
closed that the criminal proceeding was dismissed upon
the statement of counsel for the accused, that the accused
would refrain from committing certain threatened injuries
and it was held that the dismissal of the proceeding was not
at the procurement of the accused, and that an action for
malicious prosecution could be maintained thereon. 6
Two other cases concern suit for maliciously suing out
attachment without probable cause. In both cases it was
(1949) ; Stauffacher v. Brother, 67 S. D. 314, 292 N. W. 432, 128 A. L. T.
925 (1940) ; Bell Lumber Co. v. Graham, 74 Colo. 149, 219 P. 777 (1923) ;
First State Bank v. Denton, 82 Okla. 137, 198 P. 874 (1921) ; Campbell v.
Bank & Trust Co., 30 Ida. 552, 166 P. 258 (1917) ; Saner v. Bowker, 69 Mont.
463, 222 P. 1056 (1924); Forster v. Orr, 17 Or. 447, 21 P. 440 (1889);
Eustace v. Dechter, 53 Cal. App. 2d 726, 128 P. 2d 367 (1942).
54 C. J. S., MALIcIoUs PwoscuTIoN, Sec. 58, p. 1026; PaossEM, ToaTs
(1941), See. 96; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938), Sec. 660.
67 A. L. R. 513.
"Baxter v. Gordon Ironsides, etc. Co., 13 Ont. L. Rep. 598, 7 A. & E. Ann.
Cas. 452 (1907).
Wilkinson v. Howel, 1 M. & M. 495, 173 Eng. Rep. 1236 (1830).
Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26, 55 P. 703 (1898).
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held that the fact the attachment debtor settled the debt,
did not prevent his maintenance of the suit.17
The reason for the general rule varies; some courts hold
that the compromise is an admission of probable cause.
The accused admits the justice of the claim, the existence
of probable cause for instituting the proceeding and is
therefore estopped to deny the existence of probable
cause." However, the Restatement states the reason as
follows:
"Although the accused by his acceptance of a com-
promise does not admit his guilt, the fact of compro-
mise indicates that the question of his guilt or inno-
cence is left open. Having bought peace the accused
may not thereafter assert that the proceedings have
terminated in his favor."' 9
A recognized limitation to the rule is that the compro-
mise must not be induced by duress but must be voluntary
on the part of the accused. Of this exception by way of
limitation, one text writer has stated:
"If the consent (to the termination) is found to
have been given under protest because of 'duress', how-
ever, the Courts have refused to hold the cause of
action is lost. The distinction is at best a vague one,
and it may be that the Courts' opinion as to probable
guilt of the accused has entered into it."' 0
In an annotation in the American Law Reports con-
cerning the above limitation, the writer states:
"The rule as outlined . . . is not applied in cases
where the settlement was not voluntarily and under-
standingly made, but was made under coercion or
duress; nor where the dismissal is not shown to have
been the result of a valid compromise or settlement." 1
17 Harper v. Cox, 113 Kan. 357, 214 P. 775 (1923) ; Scovera v. Armbruster,
257 Mich. 340, 241 N. W. 231 (1932). But see another Michigan case, Cas-
carella v. National Grocer Co., 151 Mich. 15, 114 N. W. 857 (1908), in which
the general rule was upheld, and see also Green v. Warnock, 144 ,Kan. 170,
58 P. 2d 1059 (1936), where the Court held for defendant on the ground
that the plaintiff's attorney, with the plaintiff's knowledge had persuaded
the county attorney to dismiss the case without bringing it to trial.
18 White v. International Text-Book Co., 156 Iowa 210, 136 N. W. 121
(1912); Saner v. Bowker, 69 Mont. 463, 222 P. 1056 (1924); Morton v.
Young, 55 Me. 24, 92 Am. Dec. 565 (1867) ; Forster v. Orr, 17 Or. 447, 21
P. 440 (1889).
19 
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938), See. 660, Comment c.
10 PRossim, TORTS (1941), Sec. 96, p. 869. Parenthetical material Inserted.
67 A. L. R. 519.
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The leading case which has recognized the general rule,
but noted its exception, is White v. International Textbook
Co.22 In that case the plaintiff who was a sales agent for
defendant company was discharged because of a disagree-
ment over sums due from plaintiff. Defendant's agent
swore out a warrant for embezzlement and then contacted
plaintiff and warned him unless he turned over the sum
claimed to be due, he would be arrested. Plaintiff refused
and was taken into custody. He was later taken by the
police to defendant's office where he was again urged to
turn over the money. Plaintiff's brother-in-law was present
at this interview, defendant's agent having previously
urged him to appear and help persuade the plaintiff to turn
over the money. Plaintiff at first refused to pay, denying
the indebtedness but was at last persuaded, through the
concerted appeal of the police, defendant's agent and his
brother-in-law, who told plaintiff his wife was greatly upset
over his imprisonment. The trial Court refused to submit
the question of duress to the Jury and directed verdict for
defendant. The Appellate Court in reversing pointed out
that from the testimony, a jury was justified in finding
that the alleged settlement was not by plaintiff's procure-
ment; that the money was paid under protest and to secure
plaintiff's release; that the payment was not voluntary
but under duress, and that the whole proceeding was re-
sorted to, not for the purpose of vindicating the law, but
to compel the plaintiff to make such a settlement of his
accounts as the company's agent believed should be made.
The Court also gave weight to the fact that the accounts
were not completely settled, and that certain matters were
left open. The Court said:
"Assuming, without deciding, that one charged with
a crime may, without authority of Court, compromise
and compound it, or procure his release from the charge
in such a manner as to bar him from maintaining an
action for malicious prosecution, it must appear, we
think, that the one accused voluntarily procured his
release, that his payment was in full settlement of his
accounts and for the purpose of extinguishing a con-
ceded indebtedness, and that this payment was freely
and voluntarily made; that is to say, not under protest
or by reason of duress. Any other rule would encour-
age resort to the criminal law for the purpose of en-
forcing a debt ... ""




Several other jurisdictions have followed this excep-
tion and refused to recognize a compromise settlement as
barring the action where duress or coercion was involved
in the procurement of the compromise payment.2 4
The factual threads running through most of these cases
involve: institution of a criminal proceeding by defendant
for purposes of coercion rather than vindication of the
criminal law; a showing that the defendant did not believe
or did not have reason to believe the truth of the charges
presented; imprisonment of the plaintiff; a settlement pro-
posed or initiated by the defendant to which plaintiff as-
sents, under protest, to end his imprisonment.
The Court in Leonard v. George, however, while noting
the exception to the rule, followed a Mississippi case in
holding that plaintiff's liability to answer the criminal
charge against him, was not the sort of duress necessary
to prevent the compromise from barring the suit for ma-
licious prosecution.
In the Mississippi case, the plaintiff was arrested on a
charge of having obtained defendant's goods under false
pretenses, and was released on his payment of Court costs
and money due defendant for the goods. The Court dis-
missed the malicious prosecution suit despite plaintiff's
averment that payment was involuntary and made under
duress. The Court held that mere liability in the criminal
prosecution was not such duress as would make settlement
involuntary.25
In Leonard v. George, the Court in holding that a com-
promise settlement voluntarily entered into is not such a
favorable termination of the criminal action as to enable
the accused to maintain a suit for malicious prosecution
followed a well settled rule. The action for malicious
prosecution is not favored in the law. To allow a plaintiff
to maintain such suit after he had voluntarily compromised
and settled the criminal action, would establish an unde-
sirable precedent which might lead to the institution of a
suit for malicious prosecution upon any sort of termination
of the crimnial action except actual conviction.
However, whether or not the compromise in the par-
ticular case was made under such duress as to be involun-
tary, would seem to be a question for the jury, and the
Court here perhaps erred in holding that the settlement
21 Morton v. Young, supra, n. 18; Burkett v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337
(1860) ; Smith v. Markensohn, 29 R. I. 55, 69 A. 311 (1908) ; Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 206 Wisc. 420, 240 N. W. 177 (1932) ; Lyons v. Davy-Pocahontas
Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 739, 84 S. E. 744 (1915).
21 Jones v. Donald Co., 137 Miss. 602, 102 So. 540 (1925).
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constituted estoppel as a matter of law. Whether duress
exists in a particular transaction is usually a question of
fact.26 Duress by imprisonment was one of the two divisions
of duress of the person recognized at common law. A
Supreme Court case stated:
"... it is well settled law that moral compulsion, such
as that produced by threats to take life or to inflict
great bodily harm, as well as that produced by im-
prisonment, is sufficient to destroy free agency.... "27
Duress by imprisonment is held to exist where an arrest
is made for an improper purpose although for just cause
and under lawful authority.2" It would be possible to
find an improper purpose present here. There was evi-
dence tending to establish that defendant had told Boykin,
his manager who swore out the warrant, to get at least
partial reparation before dismissing the action. On the
basis of this the District Court in ordering a new trial on
an appeal in the malicious abuse of process case stated:
.... when all conflicts are resolved in favor of plain-
tiff and the evidence viewed in the light most favorable
to his contentions, we cannot say that there is nothing
to take the case to the jury on the theory that the
criminal process of the Court was used for an ulterior
purpose rather than for the sole purpose of vindicating
the law."29
In the light of this, it is possible that the majority
opinion was grounded on public policy which is unfavor-
able to malicious prosecution suits rather than on a strict
determination of whether or not the settlement was in fact
voluntary.
17 Am. Jun., Duums, Sec. 31, p. 906.
Baker v. Morton, 12 Wall. 150, 157-158 (1870).
Op. cit., 8supra, n. 26, See. 5, p. 876.
George v. Leonard, 169 F. 2d 177, 178 (4th Cir., 1948).
[VOL. XV r
